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Following Zhang (Accounting Review 2007) we cast firm accruals in terms of short-term investment. Since many studies 
consider accruals as a smoothed measure of cash flows, we first adopt Zhang specification and augment the standard Jones 
model with a cash-flow variable. Second, if accruals are indeed a form of short-term investment they should also be influ-
enced by firm’s performance as measured by Tobin’s q. Consequently we propose a new version of the accrual model in-
cluding a proxy for Tobin’s q. Given that accounting data and Tobin’s q are generally measured with errors, we also intro-
duce a new estimation method based on a modified version of the Hausman artificial regression, featuring an optimal 
weighting matrix composed of higher moments instrumental variable estimators. Our results suggest that all the key parame-
ters of the accrual models are indeed systematically biased with measurement errors. More importantly, our findings largely 
qualify Zhang’s conjecture on accruals, as both cash-flows and Tobin’s q are found strongly significant regressors of firm 
accruals. Relatedly we find that the Tobin’s q augmented model better isolate discretionary accruals so that the residuals of 
the equation are particularly well-suited to forecast stock returns. 
 
JEL classification: M41; C12; D92. 
 
Keywords: Discretionary accruals; Earnings management; Investment; Tobin’s q; cash-flows; Measurement 
errors;  Instrumental variable estimators. 
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Accruals, cash-flows et q de Tobin: 





Dans la lignée des travaux de Zhang (2007), nous considérons les accruals d’une firme comme une forme d’investissement à 
court terme. Puisque plusieurs études voient les accruals comme une mesure lissée des cash-flows, nous adoptons d’abord la 
spécification de Zhang et ajoutons une variable de cash-flow au modèle classique de Jones. En second lieu, si les accruals sont 
effectivement une forme d’investissement à court terme, ils devraient être influencés par la performance de la firme, telle que 
mesurée par le q de Tobin. Par conséquent, nous proposons une nouvelle version du modèle d’accruals qui incorpore une proxy 
pour le q de Tobin. Étant donné que les données comptables et le q de Tobin sont généralement entachés d’erreurs de mesure, 
nous introduisons également une nouvelle méthode d’estimation basée sur une version modifiée de la régression artificielle 
d’Hausman qui se fonde sur une matrice de pondération faisant appel à des estimateurs de variables instrumentales construits à 
partir des moments supérieurs des variables du modèle. Nos résultats suggèrent que les paramètres-clefs des modèles d’accruals 
sont biaisés systématiquement du fait des erreurs de mesure. Plus spécifiquement, nos résultats soutiennent la conjoncture de 
Zhang puisque les cash-flows et le q de Tobin se révèlent tous deux des variables explicatives importantes des accruals d’une 
firme.  
 
Classification JEL: M41; C12; D92. 
 
Mots-clefs: Accruals discrétionnaires; Manipulation des profits; Investissement; q de Tobin; cash-flows; Erreurs de mesure;  






   4
1. Introduction 
 
A fundamental drawback of cash-flows is that they present timing and matching problems 
that cause them to be a very noisy measure of firm performance. To mitigate these issues, 
accountants rely on accounting accrual system to intertemporally smooth earnings. Accruals 
are thus used to separate the timing of cash flows from their accounting recognition. Based 
on the cash-flows statement, total accruals, the sum of discretionary and non-discretionary 
accruals, are defined as the difference between firm earnings and cash-flows (Jones 1991, 
Bartov et al. 2001), and, as such, are influenced by both firm performance and earning man-
agement. For this reason, models of non-discretionary accruals, i.e. accrual models, are wide-
ly used by financial analysts to assess the level of discretionary accruals, an important indica-
tor of earnings management practices, and, more importantly, a significant predictor of stocks 
returns (Sloan 1996, Dechow and Dichev 2002, Fama and French 2007, Hirshleifer et al. 
2009). Actually, one of the main reasons why accrual models have generated such attention 
in the finance literature is precisely the fact that the residuals of accrual equations carry valu-
able information about stock returns. This relates to the famous accruals anomaly (Sloan 
1996, Dechow and Dichev 2002), which, contrary to the asset growth and profitability anom-
alies seems to be very robust (Fama and French 2007).  
To better isolate the information on earnings management embedded in the accrual equa-
tion residuals and account for the nonlinear relationship between accruals and firm perform-
ance, researchers often include in their accrual models proxies for economic values and in-
vestment potential such as property plant and equipment (PPE) and sales. However, as Zhang 
(2007) notes “Surprisingly, little is known in the literature about the investment perspective 
of accruals despite the fact that, by definition, accruals measure investment in working capi-  5
tal” (p.1336). According to Zhang’s view, the standard specification of the accrual models 
misses some important aspects of accruals, namely the fact that accruals constitute a form of 
short-term investment, at least in terms of working capital. In particular, he notes that the 
accruals anomaly might actually relate to the investment information embedded in accruals. 
In the literature, the standard models used to estimate non-discretionary accruals generally 
rely on OLS estimation (e.g., Jones 1991, Bartov et al 2001, Xie 2001, Kothari et al. 2005, 
Wu et al. 2007, among many others). It is also common to use models taking into account 
various aspects of simultaneity biases and address the problem of measurement errors associ-
ated to accruals (e.g. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan 1995, Hansen 1999, Young 1999, Hribar 
and Collins 2002, Zhang 2007, Ibrahim 2009). To control for firm performance, many studies 
include a variable such as ROA, since accruals and performance are positively related (e.g., 
Kothari et al. 2005). In this paper, we analyze two commonly used discretionary accrual 
models, the Jones (1991) model, our benchmark, and the augmented Jones model including 
cash-flows (Dechow 1994, Dechow et Dichev 2002, Hirshleifer et al. 2004, Zhang 2007, 
Hirshleifer et al. 2009), and propose a new type of model where accruals are fully specified 
as short-term investment. In this respect, the first contribution of this paper is to propose a 
third version of the accrual model where we introduce Tobin’s q as a new proxy for firm per-
formance. Tobin’s q offers the crucial advantage of being one of the most significant factors 
explaining firm investment decisions (see, among many others, Fazzari et al. 1988, Gilchrist 
and Himmelberg 1995, or Brown and Petersen 2009 and Brown et al. 2009 for recent refer-
ences). In this sense, if accruals are indeed a form of short-term investment, as Zhang (2007) 
conjectures, they should be influenced by Tobin’s q.     6
However, the inclusion of Tobin’s q adds to the endogeneity problem often encountered 
in accrual models, as this variable is notoriously plagued with measurement errors, a well 
documented fact in the investment literature (e.g., Hayashi 1982, Erickson and Withed 2000, 
2002, among many others). When examining non-discretionary and discretionary accruals – 
the latter being the error term of the accrual models – we have to bear in mind the fact that 
this error term is the portion of accruals managed by firms, so that it may sometimes be influ-
enced by various earnings management practices (Dechow et al. 1995, Beneish 1997, Burgh-
stahler and Dichev 1997, DeFond and Park, 1997, Degeorge, Jeter and Shivakumar 1999, 
Peasnell et al. 2000, Xie 2001, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocky 2003, Marquardt and Wiedman 
2004, Hirshleifer et al. 2004, Roychowdhury 2006). This may result in a statistical anomaly 
worth detecting as discretionary accruals are often used to forecast market returns. Some-
times, the accrual models account for heteroskedasticity with a form of weighted least-
squares. However the measurement errors inherent to accounting data are usually assumed to 
be systematically biased in the same direction even though they can cause a serious bias in 
the estimation if the orthogonality between the explanatory variables and the equation inno-
vation is not satisfied. Correcting for measurement errors is even more important in our case 
since we are interested by the significance of Tobin’s q, a variable also contaminated by 
measurement errors. It is thus desirable to resort to a robust estimation method in order to 
compute the accruals with the greatest possible precision (Ibrahim 2009). The second contri-
bution of this paper is precisely to propose a new method to handle this task. To this end we 
introduce new instruments based on a weighted optimal matrix of the higher moments and 
cumulants of the explanatory variables, and apply these optimal instruments to an Hausman 
artificial regression (named the Haus-C).    7
Our results suggest that measurement errors have indeed a great influence on the parame-
ters estimation of the basic Jones model. More precisely, our estimation of the accrual models 
confirms that important measurements errors contaminate the accounting measures of chang-
es in sales and fixed assets, the two explanatory variables of the Jones model. More impor-
tantly, our findings indicate that Tobin’s q, which has already a very significant positive im-
pact on non-discretionary accruals when using the standard OLS method, displays an in-
creased explanatory power when applying our Haus-C procedure. Furthermore, the Haus-C 
procedure delivers a coefficient of the error adjustment regressor comparable, in level, to the 
Tobin’s q coefficient itself. We can interpret this result as new evidence that firms expecta-
tions are partly incorporated in future cash-flows, a point often mentioned in the empirical 
literature on investment. Interestingly, if we introduce Tobin’s q in the accruals equation, the 
cash-flow variable has a smaller influence on short-term investment. When measurement 
errors are properly accounted for, the role of Tobin’s q is reinforced, while cash-flows seem 
to play a minor role, although non-trivial. The evidence we gather also tends to support the 
idea that market imperfections impend the Modigliani and Miller theorem to hold in the 
short-run. In the context of our model, these imperfections might be associated to liquidity 
constraints in earnings management, and the preference to directly self-finance accruals with 
cash-flows before resorting to external finance. 
  This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the three accrual models 
we analyze with pooled data, and some considerations to address the problem of measure-
ment errors in the models. In section 3, we detail the empirical results, and in section 4 we 
compare the residuals of these accrual equations to assess the performance of the Tobin’s q 
augmented model. Section 5 concludes.    8
2. Empirical Framework  
 
2.1 The Models 
 
With a balance sheet approach, total accruals would be defined as: 
( ) ( ) TA CA CASH CL STD TP DEP ≡ Δ −Δ − Δ −Δ −Δ −    (1)   
where ΔCA stands for change in current assets; ΔCASH, change in cash or cash equivalents; 
ΔCL, change in current liabilities; ΔSTD, change in debt included in current liabilities; ΔTP, 
change in income taxes payable; and DEP represents the depreciation and amortization expenses. 
Note however that the negative depreciation accruals tend to strongly influence the model’s fit as 
the depreciation to assets ratio is five times higher than the accounts receivable and accounts 
payable, on average (Barth, Cram and Nelson 2001). One way of dealing with this issue is to 
look at short-term accruals and omit the long-run accruals of depreciation (Teoh, Welch and 
Wong 1998a, b). Relatedly, since this study focuses on the short-term investment dimension of 
firm accruals, i.e. the working capital component of accruals, we also consider an alternative 
construct, CA, which eliminates the long-term element of equation (1), i.e. total depreciation.  
 
2.1.1  The Jones Model of Accruals 
 
 
  The Jones (1991) model of accruals, our benchmark (model I), can be written as: 
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where TA is total accruals; A, total assets; PPE, gross property plant and equipment at the end of 
year t; and ΔREV represents revenues in year t less revenues in year (t-1). As usually done in the   9
literature, we scale all variables by Ai,t-1 to account for heteroskedasticity. This precaution also 
helps control for size effects. Equation (2) may be decomposed in two parts, the non-








, represents the non- discretionary accruals, while the innovation, εit, is the discre-
tionary part of accruals. Two control variables of the benchmark model relate, respectively, to 
the two main components of accruals, working capital, and depreciation. The first control vari-
able,  it REV Δ , often replaced by the change in sales in the literature (e.g. Cormier et al. 2000), is 
associated to working capital, and the second control variable, PPEit, is linked to depreciation. 
Usually, the  it REV Δ  coefficient is found positively related to total accruals. Indeed, an increase in 
it REV Δ  should lead to an increase in working capital since accounts receivable are generally 
more sensitive to changes in sales than accounts payable
1. The coefficient of PPEit should be 
negative as PPEit determines the depreciation expenses, a negative component of accruals. Note 
however that there is potentially an endogeneity issue here because the control variable PPEit 
might be collinear to accruals, the link between depreciation and PPEit being quite strong.  
In the short-term version of the benchmark model, we omit DEP on the LHS and PPE on 
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⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
               (3) 
Note that for the sake of consistency, the same procedure is followed for each model. 
First, we present the long-term version, with DEP and PPE included in the accrual models, sec-
ond, we estimate the short-term version without PPE and DEP. 
 
                                                 
1 In some cases, the sign of this coefficient may be negative. For more details, see McNichols and Wilson (1988).    10
2.1.2  An Augmented Version of the Jones Model with Cash-Flows  
 
 
  To account for firm performance it is common to introduce cash-flows (CF) in the ac-
crual models (e.g., Dechow 1994, McNichols 2002, Francis et al. 2005 and Zhang 2007). In its 
long-term form, this standard accrual model (model II) can be written as:   
 
,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1
1 it it it it
s ss s i t
it it it it it
TA PPE REV CF
AA A A A
α βδ κ ε
−− − − −
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ Δ
=+ + ++ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟
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       (4) 
 
The corresponding short-term version of equation (4) is:   
,1 ,1 ,1 ,1
1 it it it
s ss i t





⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ Δ
=+ ++ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟
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                          (5) 
 
A standard approach often found in the accounting literature is to lag cash-flows to cor-
rect for the endogeneity of cash-flows. This procedure is generally adequate to mitigate the error 
term autocorrelation, but less appropriate to tackle the endogeneity per se (Theil 1953). Hence, in 
our models, we replace the cash-flows variable by its predicted value to ensure its orthogonality 
with the error term. An intuitive justification for doing so is that accruals are often value related, 
particularly for outperforming firms, that is firms characterized by high Tobin’s q and strong 
persistence in sales. Indeed, for these firms, accruals are strongly (positively) autocorrelated and 
also quite correlated with both firm earnings and firm cash-flows. Consequently, even though 
accrual persistence can be partly attributable to a cosmetic smoothing, through allocating total 
assets accruals strategically among few accounting periods, or any earnings management prac-
tice, including hiding information on current sales innovation, accrual persistence is also ex-
plained by firm performance, and, consequently, expected cash-flows. As a matter of fact, note 
that in a sense, this properly directly relates to the investment perspective on accruals.    11
 
2.1.3.  The Tobin’s  q Augmented Accrual model  
 
 
  To follow Zhang (2007) view about the investment perspective on firm accruals, we pro-
pose a new accrual model, model III, where we directly introduce Tobin’s q as an explanatory 
variable in the equation of long-term accruals:  
 
12 3 4 5
,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1
1 it it it it it
it
it it it it it it
TA PPE Sales q CF
AA A A A A
β ββ β β ξ
−− − − − −
⎛⎞ Δ
=+ + + + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
   (6)                
 
 where Tobin’s q, the shadow price of capital, is proxied by:  
Market valueof capital Accounting value of debts
Accounting valueof assets
+                 (7) 
Note that there are many empirical measures of Tobin’s q in the investment literature. For 
example, one popular measure used in economic studies defines Tobin’s q as the ratio of the 
market value of assets to their replacement cost. However, since we work in an accounting 
framework, we rely on an accounting definition of Tobin’s q to be more consistent with the lit-
erature on accruals. In this literature, Tobin’s q is often measured as the market-to-book ratio, 
i.e., the market value of equity scaled by book value of equity. Given the investment perspective 
of accruals we investigate, we depart slightly from this common practice to be more in the spirit 
of Tobin’s definition and consider instead the market value of equity plus the book value of debt, 
divided by assets. 
As for the previous models, we also analyse the short-term version of equation (6): 
13 4 5
,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1
1 it it it it
it
it it it it it
CA Sales q CF
AA A A A
β ββ β ξ
−− − − −
⎛⎞Δ
=+ + + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
           (8)   12
In the investment literature, Tobin’s q is, by definition, one of the predominant variables 
explaining investment. Since we want to follow Zhang’s line of reasoning, and to the extent that 
accruals decisions can be cast in terms of investment strategy, the analysis of Tobin’s q explana-
tory power seems quite natural. The intuition here is that the return on investment should be a 
key explanatory variable of firm accruals, as economic theory suggests that investment relates to 
its return. Actually, accrual models often include a return measure such as return on assets, ROA, 
to control for the non-linear effect of firm performance (Dechow and Dichev 2002, Kothari et al. 
2005). However, omitting Tobin’s q can potentially lead to a strong colinearity issue as the re-
turn on investment and cash-flows are mixed together. Indeed, according to the investment the-
ory, if financial markets are imperfect, the cash-flow variable becomes a potential significant 
regressor of investment, and financial constraints tend to influence both the capital structure and 
the performance of the firm.  As a matter of fact, this kind of drawback also applies to Tobin’s q 
itself. Theoretically, Tobin’s q is a marginal concept, but its observed empirical counterpart is an 
average one, the marginal measure being unobservable. Therefore, when using the average 
measure, cash-flows might embed information about Tobin’s q, and cash-flows and Tobin’s q 
could be colinear. This matter is dealt with in the following section, where we present the modi-
fied Hausman artificial regression used for the estimation.  
 
2.2. Estimation Method 
 
  Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) and Kang (2005) argue that OLS accrual estima-
tions can deliver misleading results and advocate instead the use of the IV approach and the 
GMM to deal with the errors-in-variables, omitted variables and simultaneity problems. In the 
same vein, since accruals and Tobin’s q are generally measured with errors, we apply a tailor-  13
made specification error correction method
2 to the three accrual models. To detect specification 
errors in the accrual models we run two sets of regressions. For example, consider model III 
(i.e. the Tobin’s q augmented model). Following Kothari et al (2005), we first run the two OLS 
regressions using equations (6) and (8), for long-term and short-term accruals respectively. 
Second, we run the following Haus-C artificial regressions: 
12 5
5
** * * * *
34
1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1
1 ˆ it it it it it
ii t i t
i it it it it it it
TA PPE Sales q CF
w
AAA AA A
β ββ β β ϕ ε
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⎛⎞ Δ
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⎝⎠
∑         (9) 
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AA AA A
β ββ β ϕ ε
= −− −− −
⎛⎞Δ
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∑                     (10)        
where, as explained in the appendix, the  ˆit w  are the residuals obtained by running the regres-
sions of the endogenous variables on the higher moments instrumental variables. These higher 
moments instruments are robust, and also have the advantage of requiring no extraneous in-
formation from the models. Equations (9) and  (10) represent the generalized version of the 
augmented accrual model for long-term and short-term, respectively. Note that the estimated 
coefficients, i ϕ , allow the detection of specification errors, and that their signs indicate whether 
the corresponding variable is overstated or understated in the OLS regression. The β
* estimated 
in these equations are equivalent to TSLS estimates, but our method presents the key advantage 
of providing additional information about the severity of the specification errors. Indeed, the φi 
measure the bias in the sensitivity of accruals to the i
th explanatory variable. If the φi  associated 
to the i
th regressor is significantly positive, then the corresponding β will be lower in the artifi-
cial regression (and vice-versa if φi is negative). In general, we can expect a high positive cor-
relation between 
* ˆˆ
ii β β − , the estimated error in the coefficient of variable i, and  ˆi ϕ , the esti-
                                                 
2 For details on this method, see the appendix.    14
mated coefficient of the corresponding artificial variable  ˆi w . We can sum up the former argu-
ment using the following equation: 
01 ii i iS p r e a d π πϕ ς ∀= + +         (11) 
where 
* ˆˆ
iii Spread β β =−. According to equation (11), the φi indicate the degree of overstatement 
or understatement of the OLS estimation, and the goodness of fit of the equation provides in-
formation about the severity of the specification errors. This constitutes a straightforward vari-




  For the distributional approach, a deviation of the distribution of earnings from the 
normal one should indicate earnings management. However, to explain the accrual conundrum 
(McNichols and Wilson 1988, Sloan 1996, Dechow and Dichev 2002)  related to the stationar-
ity of revenues and expenses (Yaari et al. 2007) it is often assumed that the ratio of accruals to 
earnings is actually a random variable. In other words, abnormal accruals might not only reflect 
earnings management of discretionary accruals but also changes in the underlying economic 
models and firm performance. Relatedly, if earnings management uses forward-looking infor-
mation, it is beneficial because it increases the predictability of accruals, but, at the same time, 
it is precisely high-performance firms which present the most persistence in earnings manage-
ment. High performance may thus erroneously lead the researcher to classify abnormal accruals 
as discretionary when the residuals of the accrual models still contain information on firm per-
formance. Hence the challenge here is to arrive at a specification which can better disentangle 
earnings management from firm performance in the residuals. A main argument in this paper is   15
that Tobin’s q  is particularly suited to control for firm performance and isolate earnings man-
agement in the discretionary accruals used to forecast stock returns. To show this, we need to 
analyze data on high performance firms and compare our Tobin’s q augmented model to the 
standard accrual models. Consequently, we use a sample composed of all the non financial 
firms registered in the S&P500 index. The observations are retrieved from the U.S. COM-
PUSTAT database. Data are annual and run from December 1989 to December 2006. As pre-
viously done by most researchers (e.g. Kothari et al. 2005), we exclude firms displaying miss-
ing observations. After having discarded, among the 500 firms constituting the index, the firms 
with missing information, we have a total of around 10000 pooled observations.  
Since the objective of this study is to shed light on the relationship between accruals 
and key investment factors, instead of analyzing industrial sectors individually, we focus our 
attention on representative firms. We thus adjust firm data for size, and run our regressions 
using pooling methods. Each year the sample does not vary much given that, in our data set, 
most firms are good performers and the sample is quite homogeneous, which, per se, mitigates 
the issue of composition effect. Consequently we can follow Ye (2006) who advocates pooling 
to improve the goodness of fit of the accrual models, and instead of slicing the sample by year 
and industry, we thus chose firm pooling, which also offers the advantage of a more parsimo-
nious approach for testing the presence of measurement errors when estimating accrual models.  
Insert table 1 here 
   Total accruals are computed using a balance sheet approach, i.e. change in non-cash 
current assets (Compustat #4 – #1) less change in current liabilities (Compustat #5), excluding 
the current portion of long-term debt (Compustat #44), less depreciation (Compustat #14) and 
taxes (Compustat #71). The annual cash-flows variable is operating cash-flows computed as   16
the mean value of the monthly data.  ΔSales is the difference of revenues in year t and revenues 
in year (t-1) (Compustat #12). PPE, the acronym for property, plant and equipment, is meas-
ured at the end of year t (Compustat #7).  
Table 1 provides the correlation between these variables. At first glance, this table 
shows that some explanatory variables might present a significant degree of correlation with 
each other, which might cause some multicollinearity issues in the regressions. For instance, 




3.1 OLS Estimations  
 
  In Table 2 we provide the OLS estimation results for the long-term accrual models, 
correcting for heteroskedasticity and treating size effects. Based on the adjusted R
2 (at 0.74, 
0.77 and 0.80 for the three models, respectively) the equations seem to perform quite well. The 
best model in terms of adjusted R
2 is model III. In the equation, except for ΔSales, all the coef-
ficients are significant at the 99% confidence level. The Durbin-Watson statistics are quite sim-
ilar across models, ranging from 1.98 to 2.12 and, in light of the R
2, there thus seems to be no 
apparent autocorrelation or non-stationary residuals problems.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
  When comparing the coefficients of models II and III, first note the similarities in terms 
of values and signs of the coefficients. For instance, the coefficient of PPE is -0.0514 in model 
II, and -0.0554 in model III. We obtain the same results for the estimated coefficients of CF,   17
respectively 0.3336 and 0.3086  (and ΔSALES, 0.0005 versus 0.0003). At first, the positive sign 
of CF might be somewhat surprising. After all, total accruals (not necessarily short-term) are 
typically high when cash-flows are low, and vice-versa, and, as a result, accruals are negatively 
correlated with contemporaneous cash-flows. However, total accruals are also positively corre-
lated with lagged and leaded cash-flows (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Indeed remind that accru-
als can be viewed as a smoothed measure of CF. Hence, even if the contemporaneous CF are 
negatively correlated with accruals, since we take the twelve month average of CF it is not so 
surprising to get an overall positive correlation.  In other respects, note that for model I the es-
timated coefficient of PPE and ΔSALES are larger, at -0.1686 and 0.0026 respectively. Obvi-
ously, this finding is partly attributable to the omission of cash-flows.  In fact, Table 1 indicates 
that the correlation between PPE and cash-flows is equal to 0.70, which suggests that a great 
proportion of the impact of PPE is transferred to cash-flows when shifting from model I to 
model II, the coefficient of cash-flows being equal to 0.3336 in model II. Overall these results 
suggest that accruals are indeed sensitive to cash-flows, a fact which could be consistent with 
the investment perspective on accruals. The intuition here would be that market imperfections 
and financial constraints influence earnings management and short-term investment. The intro-
duction of Tobin's q also delivers results in the same vein. According to the investment theory, 
to the extent that accruals can be viewed as a form of short-term investment, they should be 
positively influenced by Tobin’s q. Our results clearly support this view, as the Tobin's q coef-
ficient is equal to 4.0897 and significant at the 99% confidence level.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
  Table 3 reports the corresponding results for the short-term versions of the three mod-
els. In spite of the omission of the PPE variable, and the associated removal of the depreciation   18
component of accruals, the results remain very comparable to those of the long-term versions, 
both in terms of sign and magnitude of the coefficients. In particular they confirm that the vari-
ables traditionally used as regressors in investment equations are also significant explanatory 
variables of firm accruals.  
  However, there are some differences between the results obtained from the estimation 
of the short-term versus the long-term versions of our models. First, the impact of ΔSALES is 
more important in the short-term versions. For instance, in model II, the coefficient of ΔSALES 
is respectively 0.0005 (not significant) and 0.0086 (significant) in the long-term and short-term 
versions. Second, the influence of the Tobin’s q coefficient is also larger in the short-term ver-
sion (5.2361) compared to the long-term one (4.0897). The greater value of the Tobin’s q coef-
ficient is partly attributable to the cash-flows variable, whose coefficient decreases from 0.3086 
to 0.2234 when shifting from the long-term to the short-term model.  
Finally note that the DW statistics are rarely reported in the accruals studies. Yet, the re-
siduals of the estimated accrual models – i.e., the discretionary accruals – should not be autocor-
related, because if they were, the returns forecast on which they are based could be biased. Look-
ing at the data we find that accruals are indeed autoregressive. However, the influence of earn-
ings management cannot last indefinitely and the residuals ought to converge to zero eventually. 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) regress working capital on lead and lag of cash-flows, which, as not-
ed previously, might constitute an indirect way to control for accruals autoregressivity. In our 
case, we follow Beneish (1997) and Dechow et al. (2003) and add autoregressive terms in the 
regressions going backwards up to five periods to control for reversals. Using this method to 
control for the accruals autocorrelation improves the fit of the models, and the DW statistics sug-
gests no remaining autocorrelation in the residuals.   
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3.2 Haus-C Estimations  
 
  Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the corresponding Haus-C estimations for the three 
models corrected for heteroskedasticity, for the long-run and short term accruals respectively. 
For the three models the levels of the Durbin-Watson do not seem to indicate any significant 
autocorrelation. Although most variables are significant at the 95% confidence level, Table 4 
indicates that the Haus-C regressions systematically yield lower R
2, 0.28, 0.48 and 0.39 respec-
tively. This confirms that measurement errors in the explanatory variables indeed cause signifi-
cant biases in the OLS regressions. More importantly, looking at the significance levels, model 
III seems clearly to outperform the other models. For instance, as reported in Table 4, the coef-
ficient of ΔSALES is significant in model III and not significant in model II, and, once again, 
the estimated impact of PPE on accruals seems overstated in model II relative to model III. 
Actually, when shifting from model II to model III, the decrease in the PPE coefficient from    
-0.1605 to -0.0786 coincides with an increase of the cash-flows coefficient from 0.1435 to 
0.2866. This suggests that the greater influence of PPE in model II is likely due to misspecifi-
cation.  
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
  To analyze further the issue of measurement errors let focus on model III. As expected, 
the  ˆi ϕ  indicate the presence of substantial measurement errors for all the explanatory variables. 
First, Table 4 reveals that the most commonly used explanatory variables of accruals, ΔSALES, 
PPE and 1/Ai,t-1,  seem to be measured with significant error which translates into mispecifica-
tion. One common explanation for this is that these accounting variables are used in accrual 
models as proxies for economic values. The error on 1/Ai,t-1 is particularly severe, which could   20
explain the great instability of this coefficient and its changing sign when moving from one 
specification to another. Second, the coefficient of ΔSALES changes substantially from one 
model to another, and it also seems to be quite contaminated. More precisely, for model III, the 
ˆi ϕ  coefficient of ΔSALES is equal to -0.0612, significant at the 99% confidence level, whereas 
in the OLS estimation the coefficient of this variable is almost 0. The Haus-C result thus sug-
gests a severe understatement of this coefficient in the OLS estimation. There is also a signifi-
cant measurement error for the PPE variable, its  ˆi ϕ  being equal to 0.0840 in model III, signifi-
cant at the 99% confidence level. In this case, there is an overstatement of the coefficient in the 
OLS regression.  
  More importantly, the cash-flow coefficient doubles when Tobin’s q is introduced. In 
model III, the cash-flow coefficient is equal to 0.2866, significant at the 99% confidence level, 
with a coefficient of understatement of -0.3182, significant at the 99% level, whereas in model 
II, from which Tobin’s q is absent, the coefficient is lower, at 0.1435, with a coefficient of un-
derstatement of -0.1313. Since the correlation between cash-flows and Tobin’s q is very low 
(cf. Table 1), this result cannot be attributed to collinearity. Actually, the introduction of To-
bin’s q generally increases the sensitivity of accruals to the other explanatory variables as well, 
and improves the fit of the model once errors-in-variables are accounted for. Furthermore, the 
Haus-C results confirm the expected positive relationship between accruals and Tobin's q, the 
influence of this regressor being significant at the 99% confidence level. Consistent with the 
conventional view that proxies of marginal Tobin’s q are usually badly measured, the coeffi-
cient of Tobin's q estimated by OLS is about 4.0897 in model III, and much higher, at 6.3103, 
significant at 95%, when estimated with the Haus-C procedure. The error adjustment vari-
able, 5 ˆ t w , at 9.6702, confirms the substantial measurement error of this variable.   21
  In other respects, the short-term models perform poorly in the Haus-C estimations. For 
example, as reported in Table 5, the adjusted R
2 is almost halved when PPE is excluded. In the 
short-term version of the models, the levels of all the coefficients are also lower. However, the 
specification remains qualitatively robust and the explanatory variables are still significant and 
of the right sign. Besides note that, consistent with the OLS results, when excluding PPE from 
model III the influence of Tobin’s q is strengthened, while the impact of cash-flows is divided 
by two, and its coefficient becomes only significant at the 90% confidence level. Not only is 
the influence of Tobin’s q relative to cash-flow higher in the short-term model III, but it is even 
larger if we account for measurement errors. Going from OLS to Haus-C, the coefficient in-
creases from 5.2361 to 8.6652. Hence, when correcting for measurement errors, the explana-
tory power of cash-flows seems to weaken in the short-term accrual models. This result could 
be paralleled to the one reported by Erickson and Whited (2000) for (long-term) investment. 
Quite counter-intuitively however, everything works as if the classical theory of investment 
applied more at a shorter horizon, firm performance influence on short-term investment and 
earnings management being reinforced whilst cash-flows influence would be dampened fur-
ther. To understand this finding, we have to bear in mind the fact that in the short-term accrual 
models PPE is excluded. Since this variable, as often documented in previous studies, is highly 
correlated with cash-flows, it should not be too surprising to find cash-flows more significant 
in the long-term version of the models, including PPE, and this, regardless of the way errors-
in-variables are treated. In other words, the lack of significance of cash-flows in the short-term 
accrual models is partly an artefact of the PPE cash-flows correlation.  
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4.  Accruals Residuals Analysis 
 
The problem with the residuals of the accrual models used to forecast stock returns is 
that discretionary accruals do not necessarily reflect earnings management only since accruals 
are also related to firm performance, so that differences in estimated discretionary accruals can 
be due to performance characteristics rather than incentives to manage earnings – particularly 
so if the relationship between accruals and performance is nonlinear. In this paper, we rely on 
OLS but also Haus-C to estimate Tobin’s q augmented model of accruals and argue that this 
model provides a better specification of firm accruals. If this is the case, our model should de-
liver residuals which better isolate the earnings management of discretionary accruals. To 
check this conjecture and gauge the respective merits of each model specification, it is thus 
very instructive to study the residuals of our regressions – i.e., the discretionary part of accru-
als. From an econometric perspective, the mean of the residuals of a regression ought to be 
equal to 0 in order to avoid any bias in the estimation. In this respect, TDA, total discretionary 
accruals, also ought to be 0 in the long-run since no earnings management practice can influ-
ence financial results indefinitely (Ronen and Yaari 2008). Figure 1 and Figure 2 provide the 
distributions of total discretionary accruals, TDA, and current discretionary accruals, CDA, re-
spectively, both expressed in terms of total assets for models I and III. Once again, compared 
to model I, model III seems to better perform along this dimension. Indeed in Figure 1 note that 
the mean of TDA is equal to 0.055
3 when estimated with model I, whereas it is practically 0 
when estimated with model III. Therefore, having a mean of zero, the TDA associated to model 
III seem more appropriate to forecast returns. Relatedly, regardless of the model considered, 
                                                 
3 Remind that accruals are defined in terms of assets.    23
the TDA distribution seems positively skewed. For instance, for model III, the skewness coeffi-
cient is equal to 7.28, which suggests that discretionary accruals are likely influenced by vari-
ous earnings management practices. As a matter of fact, it is remarkable to see that while the 
mean of model III residuals is lower, the skewness of the residuals is higher. One obvious ex-
planation for this is that, by effectively controlling for firm performance, Tobin’s q is indeed 
able to better isolate the earnings management information contained in discretionary accruals.  
In other respects, as it is the case for TDA, the CDA mean goes down to 0 when the fi-
nancial variables (cash flows and Tobin’s q) are introduced (Figure 2). As shown in Figure 2, 
the CDA mean for model I, at 0.088, is higher than the corresponding mean of TDA, and the 
CDA skewness coefficient, at 10.47, is much higher than its TDA counterpart. This confirms 
that discretionary accruals are indeed manipulated especially at short horizons. A look at the 
skewness coefficient confirms this view as the larger coefficient observed for model III (10.47 
versus 8.54 for model I) suggests that the distribution of the residuals can no longer be attrib-
uted to firm performance.  
Overall, our results suggest that the residuals of model III are better suited for financial 
analysis as they are better purged from the normal link between stock returns and investment.   
 
5. Conclusion 
  Some econometric challenges are related to the estimation of our augmented accrual 
model. A well-known issue relates to the difficulty in properly estimating Tobin’s q given that 
it is not directly observable. As usually done in the investment literature, we rely on an average 
measure to proxy Tobin’s q. There is thus an inherent measurement error related to the compu-
tation of this ratio. Ignoring the appropriate correction entails an empirical interaction between   24
cash-flows and Tobin’s q which biases the estimated coefficients of both variables. We thus 
resort to a specific estimation procedure to tackle this measurement error. Based on this meth-
odology we are also able to detect serious measurement errors in the basic accrual model and 
its augmented versions. The estimation of the augmented accrual model we propose reveals 
that the differences between the coefficients obtained from the IV method and those resulting 
from OLS are substantial, which suggests the presence of significant measurement errors in all 
variables. 
More importantly, we find Tobin’s q to be a significant explanatory variable of firm ac-
cruals. We can also confirm the influence of financial constraints on accruals management, but 
also that the impact of cash-flows is actually reduced when simultaneously introducing Tobin’s 
q and accounting for measurement errors in the short-term version of the model.  
  Obviously, many questions remain open to investigation. Accrual models aim at analyz-
ing the fundamental factors which normally influence CF smoothing in order to identify earn-
ings management patterns with the residuals – i.e., with the discretionary accruals. With the 
introduction of Tobin’s q we find more appropriate estimated residuals in the sense that they 
are closer to zero on average. This is due to the fact that our approach removes more effec-
tively from accruals residuals the information related to firms performance. This might prove 
particularly useful for portfolio managers and financial analysts since discretionary accruals 
provide an important information to forecast stocks returns. However, we do not know per se 
whether the residuals of the Tobin’s q augmented model are better suited to forecast stock re-
turns. Given the nonlinear relationship between accruals and firm performance, autoregressive 
behavior of accruals and the skewness coefficients we still obtain, it would be interesting to 
study this question with a GARCH approach. This is left for future work.    25
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Appendix 
A.1 The Choice of Instruments
4 
 
Since accrual models usually present specification errors, the condition of orthogonality 
is generally violated and the estimators of the coefficients of the models are not unbiased and 
consistent. To reduce the estimation biases in these coefficients, we thus regress, in a first pass, 
the endogenous explanatory variables on instrumental ones. The delicate part is to judiciously 
choose the instruments. To deal with specification errors, Geary (1942), Durbin (1954), Kend-
all and Stewart (1963), Pal (1980), Fuller (1987), and more recently Dagenais and Dagenais 
(1997) and Lewbel (1997) have proposed instruments based on higher moments and cumu-
lants. Racicot and Théoret (2009) generalize these instruments and apply them to financial 
models of returns, testing and correcting specification errors in a GMM framework. As a mat-
ter of fact, the literature on financial risk relies increasingly on the cumulants as more reliable 
measures of risk (Malevergne and Sornette 2005). 
The set of new instruments we propose to build an estimator accounting for specifica-
tion errors (and more specifically measurement errors) is based on an optimal combination of 
the estimators of Durbin (1954) and Pal (1980). Let us first assume the following general form 
y α β =+ X , where y is the vector (n  ×1) representing the dependent variable, here accruals, 
and X is the matrix (n × k) of the explanatory variables
5. β is the (k ×1) vector of parameters to 
estimate. Assume further the existence of specification errors in the explanatory variables 
which might create inconsistency in the estimation of the vector β. To tackle this issue, Durbin 
(1954) proposes to use as instruments the following product: x*x, where x is the X matrix of 
                                                 
4 For this section, see: Racicot and Théoret 2009. 
5 In model III of short-term accruals, the matrix X is equal to [1/Ai ΔSalesi/Ai CFi qi/Ai].    31
the explanatory variables expressed in deviation from the mean, and where the symbol * stands 
for the Hadamard element by element matrix multiplication operator. In the same vein, Pal 
(1980) introduces as instruments cumulants based on the third power of x instead of the 
squares, as Durbin. Combining these instruments, we obtain a new matrix of instruments Z 
based on the cumulants and co-cumulants of x and y, these being the matrix X and the vector y 
expressed in deviation from the mean. This Z matrix may be partitioned into k vectors or se-
ries, i.e.  [] 12 ... k zz z = Z . The vector z1, built with the first explanatory variable, is the in-
strument of the first explanatory variable, and so on. We regress the explanatory variables on 





xZ Z ' Z Z ' x                   (12) 
Then the new optimal instruments  ˆ
c w  based on cumulants of the explanatory variables 
are defined as: 
12 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ [ ... ]
cc c
k ww w =−=
c wx x        (13) 
In their study, Racicot and Théoret (2009) find that these instruments are orthogonal to 
the estimated residuals. The correlation between  ˆ
c
i w  and the corresponding explanatory vari-
able xi is around 90%, and the correlation is close to 0 with the other explanatory variables. In 
this sense, these instruments can be considered optimal. To improve the existing instrumental 
methods used to tackle the endogeneity issue in accrual models, we thus adopt the  ˆ
c
i w  instru-
ments they developed with a modified version of the Hausman (1978) artificial regression.  
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 A.2. The Augmented Hausman Artificial Regression
6 
 
  To detect specification errors in our sample of firms, we could use the original Haus-
man h test
7 with the following classical linear regression model: y = + Xβε , where y is a (n×1) 
vector representing the dependent variable; X, a (n×k) matrix of the explanatory variables; β, a 
(k ×1) parameters vector, and ε ~ iid (0,
2 σ ). The Hausman test compares two estimates of the 
parameters vector, βOLS, the least-squares estimator (OLS), and βA, an alternative estimator 
taking a variety of specifications, the instrumental variables estimator βIV in our case. The hy-
pothesis H0 is the absence of specification errors, and H1, their presence. First note that the vec-
tor of estimates βIV is consistent under both H0 and H1, whereas βOLS is only consistent under 
H0 and not consistent under H1. Consequently, under H0, βIV is less efficient than βOLS. Second, 
the Hausman test aims at verifying if “the endogeneity” of some variables – in our case the 
variables measured with errors – has any significant effect on the estimation of the parameters 
vector. Therefore, the Hausman test is an orthogonality test, that is, helping verify if plim (1/T) 
X’ε = 0 in large samples. To implement the test, we define the following vector of contrasts or 
distances:  − IV OLS ββ . The resulting h test statistic reads: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ()




⎡⎤ =− − −
⎣⎦
1
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS ββ Var β Var ββ β  ,  with  ( ) ˆ
IV Var β  and  ( ) ˆ
OLS Var β  
the respective estimates of the covariance matrices of  ˆ
IV β  and  ˆ
OLS β , and g the number of poten-
tially endogenous regressors. H0 is rejected if the p-value of this test is less than α, the critical 
threshold of the test (e.g. 5%). Third, and more importantly, note that, according to MacKinnon 
                                                 
6 For previous applications of this method see Coën and Racicot (2007) and Racicot and Théoret (2009).  
7 For details on the Hausman test, see : Hausman (1978), Wu (1973), MacKinnon (1992) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998). A very good presen-
tation of the version of the Hausman test using an artificial regression in the context of correction of errors-in-variables may be found in Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (1998). They present the case of one explanatory variable, whereas we apply it to the case of multiple explanatory variables.    33
(1992), the h test might also run into difficulties if the matrix  ( ) ( ) ˆˆ [] − IV OLS Var β Var β , which 
weights the vector of contrasts, is not positive definite. Since this is the case with most of the 
accrual models we study, we rely instead on an alternative method to run our Hausman test. 
For example, assume a five-variables linear regression model (e.g., the long-term version of the 









=+ + ∑           (14) 
with  ()
2 ~0 , iid ε σ .  
and that the variables 
*
it x
8 are measured with errors, that is: 
*
it it it xx υ = +             (15) 
with  it x  the corresponding observed variables measured with errors. By substituting equation 


















=− ∑ . As explained before, estimating the coefficients of equation (16) by the 
OLS method leads to biased and inconsistent coefficients because the explanatory variables are 
correlated with the innovation. Consistent estimators can be found if we can identify an in-
strument vector zt which is correlated with every explanatory variable but not with the innova-
tion of equation (16). Then we regress the five explanatory variables on zt. We have: 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ it it it i it x xw w γ =+= + t z         (17) 
                                                 
8 We use the asterisks to designate the unobserved variables.   34
where  ˆit x  is the value of xit estimated with the vector of instruments, and  ˆit w  the residuals of 
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=+ + + ∑∑         (18) 
The explanatory variables of this equation are, on the one hand, the estimated values of 
xit, obtained by regressing the five variables on the vector of instruments zt, and on the other 
hand, the respective residuals of these regressions. Therefore equation (18) is an augmented 
version of equation (16). 















⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ == − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∑ ∑      (19) 
If there is no specification error,  0
2
υi σ = , the OLS estimation results in a consistent estimator 
for  i β , the parameter of  ˆit w  in equation (18), and the coefficient is then equal to the one of the 
corresponding explanatory variable. In the case of specification errors,
2 0
i υ σ ≠  and, therefore, 
the estimator is not consistent. For detecting the presence of specification errors, as we do not 
know a priori if there are such errors, we first have to replace the coefficients of the  ˆit w in equa-
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=+ + − + ∑∑         (21)                                                                   35
  If there is no specification error for xit,  ii θ β = . In the opposite case,  ii θ β ≠ , and the co-
efficients of the residuals terms  ˆit w  are significantly different from 0. A significantly positive 
estimate of ( ) ii θ β −  indicates that the estimated coefficient of the corresponding explanatory 
variable, xit , is overstated in the OLS regression. In this case, the estimated coefficient for this 
variable in equation (21) is lower compared to the OLS one. On the other hand, if the estimated 
coefficient  ( ) ii θ β −  is significantly negative, it suggests that the estimated coefficient of the 
corresponding explanatory variable xit is understated by OLS, and consequently, the estimated 
coefficient for this variable is higher in equation (21). In other respects, the estimated coeffi-
cients  βi  are identical to those produced by a TSLS procedure with the same instruments 
(Spencer and Berk 1981), except that, compared to a strict TSLS, equation (21) also provides 
additional information which proves quite helpful when estimating accruals. In the procedure 
we propose to test for specification errors, we first regress the observed explanatory variables 
xit on the instruments vector to obtain the residuals  ˆit w . Then, we regress yt on the observed 
explanatory variables xit and on these residuals  ˆit w . This is the auxiliary (or artificial) regres-
sion we just described. If the coefficient of the residuals associated to an explanatory variable 
is significantly different from 0, we can directly infer the presence of a specification error. In 
this case, a t test is used to assess the severity of the specification error. To our knowledge, 
such a test has never been used in this context. Usually, a Wald test (F test) is performed to 
check whether the whole set of ( ) ii θ β −  coefficients is significantly different from zero, but 
this ignores the case of specification errors associated to a specific subset of explanatory vari-
ables.  We can generalize the former procedure to the case of k explanatory variables with our 
modified Hausman regression. Let X be a (n×k) matrix of explanatory variables not orthogonal   36
to the innovation, and let Z be a (n×s) matrix of instruments (s>k). We regress X on Z to ob-
tain  ˆ X:  
() ˆ ˆ −
== =
1
Z XZ θ ZZ ' Z Z ' X PX           (22) 
where PZ is the “predicted value maker”. Having run this regression, we can compute the ma-
trix of residuals  ˆ w: 
( ) ˆ ˆ =−=− =− ZZ wXXXP X IPX        (23) 
and perform the following artificial regression: 
ˆ = + yX β wλ                    (24) 
A F test on the λ coefficients indicates whether the  ˆ ware significant as a group. But we also 
introduce a t test on each individual coefficient to check whether the corresponding β is under-
stated or overstated. The vector of β estimated in equation (24) is identical to the TSLS esti-














Table 1 Variables Correlation Matrix 
 
   TA CF  ΔSALES  ROA PPE  q 
TA  1.00 0.30 -0.04  0.02  -0.02  0.14 
CF  0.30 1.00  0.04  -0.01  0.70  -0.01 
ΔSALES  -0.04 0.04  1.00  -0.01  0.07  -0.01 
ROA  0.02 -0.01 -0.01  1.00  -0.02  0.04 
PPE  -0.02 0.70  0.07  -0.02  1.00  -0.10 
q  0.14 -0.01 -0.01  0.04  -0.10  1.00 
 
Note. TA represents total assets; CF, cash-flows; ΔSALES, the change in sales; ROA, the return on assets; PPE, prop-




























Table 2 OLS estimation of the three models (long-term versions) 
 
   Model I  Model II  Model III 
1/Ai,t-1  -0.0873 2.7080***  0.3892*** 
PPEit/Ai,t-1  -0.1686*** -0.0514*** -0.0554*** 
ΔSALESit/Ai,t-1  0.0026 0.0005 0.0003 
CFit/Ai,t-1   0.3336***  0.3086*** 
qit/Ai,t-1     4.0897*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.74 0.77 0.80 
DW  2.01 2.12 1.98 
 
Note. The long-term versions of models I, II and III are described respectively in equa-
tions 2, 4 and 6. The definition of the variables is provided in Table 1. The explanatory 
variables are scaled by lagged assets to account for heteroskeadsticity. Asterisks indi-
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Table 3 OLS estimation of the three models (short-term versions) 
 
   Model I  Model II  Model III 
1/Ai,t-1  -0.1868*** -0.2032*** -0.1338*** 
ΔSALESit/Ai,t-1  0.0040*** 0.0086***  0.0047 
CFit/Ai,t-1   0.3595***  0.2234*** 
qit/Ai,t-1     5.2361*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.71 0.73 0.74 
DW  2.04 1.93 2.23 
 
Note. The short-term versions of models I, II and III are associated respectively to 
equations 3, 5 and 8. The definition of the variables is provided in Table 1. The ex-
planatory variables are scaled by lagged assets to account for heteroskeadsticity. Aster-
isks indicate the significance levels: * stands for 10%, ** stands for 5% and *** stands 
for 1%. 
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Table 4 Haus-C estimations of the three models (long-term versions) 
 
Model I Model II Model III
1/Ai,t-1 1.3504*** 0.2161*** 0.6714***
PPEit/Ai,t-1 -0.0142 -0.1605*** -0.0786***









2 0.28 0.48 0.39
DW 2.10 1.20 2.11






Note. The long-term versions of models I, II and III are described respectively in equa-
tions 2, 4 and 6. The definition of the variables is provided in Table 1. The explanatory 
variables are scaled by lagged assets to account for heteroskeadsticity. Asterisks indi-
cate the significance levels: * stands for 10%, ** stands for 5% and *** stands for 1%. 
The Haus-C procedure is explained in the appendix of this article. There is one artificial 
Hausman variable, designated by  ˆ
i w , for each explanatory variables of the models 
(e.g.,, i = 1,..,5 for model III). For instance,  5 ˆ w is the Hausman artificial variable asso-
ciated to Tobin’s q. It is the residuals of the OLS regression of Tobin’s q on the chosen 
instruments provided in the appendix. The variable  5 ˆ w  gauges the measurement error 
of this variable. A positive sign indicates that the impact of the variable is overstated in 















Table 5 Haus-C estimations of the three models (short-term versions) 
 
Model I Model II Model III
1/Ai,t-1 1.6067*** 1.4031*** 0.4142**








2 0.13 0.18 0.21
DW 2.06 2.02 2.04
t w 1 ˆ
t w2 ˆ
t w3 ˆ
t w 4 ˆ
 
Note. The short-term versions of models I, II and III are given respectively by equa-
tions 3, 5 and 8. The definition of the variables is provided by Table 1. The explanatory 
variables are scaled by lagged assets to account for heteroskeadsticity. Asterisks indi-
cate the significance levels: * stands for 10%, ** stands for 5% and *** stands for 1%. 
The Haus-C procedure is explained in the appendix of this article. There is one artificial 
Hausman variable, designated by  ˆ
i w , for each explanatory variables of the models 
(e.g.,, i = 1,..,5 for model III). For instance,  5 ˆ w is the Hausman artificial variable asso-
ciated to Tobin’s q. It is the residuals of the OLS regression of Tobin’s q on the chosen 
instruments provided in the appendix. The variable  5 ˆ w  gauges the measurement error 
of this variable. A positive sign indicates that the impact of the variable is overstated in 
the OLS regression, while a negative sign indicates the opposite.  
 
 















-2.50 -1.25 0.00 1.25 2.50 3.75 5.00 6.25
Series: TA_HAUSC_MODEL1
Mean        0.055157
Median    0.014857
Maximum   6.046117
Minimum -2.617825
Std. Dev.    0.317796
Skewness    5.080679












-1.25 0.00 1.25 2.50 3.75 5.00 6.25
Series: TA_HAUSC_MODEL3
Mean        4.52e-12
Median   -0.033077
Maximum   6.601697
Minimum -2.104556
Std. Dev.    0.283228
Skewness    7.282170




Note. These histograms are built using the residuals of the accrual (long-term) models I and III 
whose estimation appears in Table 4, discretionary accruals being the residuals of the estimated 













-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Series: CA_HAUSC_MODEL1
Mean        0.088412
Median    0.047000
Maximum   9.974600
Minimum -3.594500
Std. Dev.    0.444797
Skewness    8.542643















-2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Series: CA_HAUSC_MODEL3
Mean       -8.37e-07
Median   -0.035000
Maximum   10.22830
Minimum -3.004500
Std. Dev.    0.425926
Skewness    10.47337




Note. These histograms are built using the residuals of the accrual (short-term) models I and III whose estimation 
appears in Table 4, discretionary accruals being the residuals of the estimated accrual models.  
 
 
 